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This article investigates the enforcement of mortgages in South Africa and England. It
specifically focuses on the influence of human-rights housing principles in so far as they
may require courts to conduct a proportionality enquiry whenever a legal process leads to
the loss of a home. It appears that art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms — essentially the United Kingdom’s
housing clause — is conceptually similar to s 26(1) of the South African Constitution.
The underlying idea is that, when a home is violated, justification must be provided as
regards the proportionate relationship between the purpose of the violation and the impact
of the violation on the occupier. English law already accepts that this principle applies
when local authorities seek to evict unlawful occupiers, but this approach has not yet been
extended to mortgage repossessions. Conversely, South African law already acknowledges
that the housing clause must be applied in mortgage cases. After investigating
developments in both jurisdictions, the article concludes that a proportionality test is
workable in mortgage cases. Furthermore, the traditional assumption that ‘creditors must
win’, although still relatively strong, is in the process of being replaced by a more
contextual approach.
I INTRODUCTION
Mortgage ﬁnancing is a vital aspect of the housing market in many countries,
including the countries which form the subject of this article, namely the
United Kingdom and South Africa. The downside occurs when the debtor,
who has obtained a loan to ﬁnance the purchase of his or her home and has
granted the creditor a mortgage as security, defaults and the creditor’s right to
enforce the mortgage so as to settle the outstanding capital debt is triggered.
When this happens, the debtor/occupier invariably faces eviction — that is,
the loss of his or her home. While the necessity of enforcement is recognised
as it encourages credit provision for the acquisition of homes and gives effect
to creditors’ valid contractual and proprietary rights, there is also a growing
unease about the reality that a home is lost.
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Finding a balance between the creditor’s interests in enforcing the
mortgage and the debtor’s interests in his or her home has been the subject of
controversy in both jurisdictions. Particularly in the United Kingdom,
arguments have been put forward in support of greater recognition of
occupiers’ home interests, independent of ﬁnancial factors. In this regard one
need only mention the work of the likes of Lorna Fox O’Mahony. This
author points out that, even though home interests are increasingly present in
legal discourse, the creditor’s interests almost always automatically win.1
Accordingly, there is a ‘cycle of reasoning’ that prevents home interests from
receiving more attention in the balancing process.2 She explains this way of
thinking as follows:
‘[C]reditors ought to prevail, so there is no need to investigate the meaning and
value of the home interest; the home interest is not explored in the courts;
therefore creditors continue to prevail.’3
Fox’s writings relate to the position in England; but her conclusions also
represent the traditional position (and broadly held assumption) in South
African law, although there have been developments which have seriously
undermined this assumption.
Fox argues that the importance of a home (and the effects of losing it)
should enjoy more explicit attention when the interests of debtors and
creditors are being balanced.4 She insists that the ‘creditors must win’
presumption — as a starting point for deciding possession cases — is ﬂawed.5
At a conceptual level, the difﬁculty is that the creditor’s interest is of an
economic nature and therefore easy to quantify and give effect to. By
contrast, home interests include ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial aspects. Espe-
cially the non-ﬁnancial elements are difﬁcult to weigh against the creditor’s
ﬁnancial interest. Fox does not question the legitimacy of creditors’ commer-
cial claims, and she does not suggest that creditors should lose their
proprietary rights in the mortgaged home. Nor does she argue that home
interests should always prevail against creditors’ rights.6 Instead, she proposes
the possibility of striking a different balance between the conﬂicting rights.7
This article focuses on one factor that could open the door to lending
greater weight to the ‘home’ as a legally recognised consideration in
mortgage cases, namely the inﬂuence of human-rights norms as regards
housing. The reason for this focus is that SouthAfrican law has been strongly
1 Lorna Fox Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (2007) 79; Lorna Fox
‘Themeaning of home:Achimerical concept or a legal challenge?’ (2002) 29 Journal of
Law and Society 580 at 585.
2 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 79.
3 Ibid at 80.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid at 12. See also at 122–8, where the author makes a case for reconsidering
the pro-creditor presumption inmortgage law.
6 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 28; Fox 2002 Journal of Law and Society
op cit note 1 at 587.
7 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 29.
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inﬂuenced by human rights in recent years — not only generally, but also in
the private-law mortgage enforcement context. The tricky issue is that of
allowing a human-rights-based defence even though the party claiming
possession of the house has an apparently unqualiﬁed right to such possession
under domestic law. English case law has accepted (albeit reluctantly) the
possibility that possessory actions by local authorities against unlawful
occupiers of rented property may be scrutinised on the basis of art 8 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, 1950 (‘the Convention’). However, the courts have yet
expressly to recognise the inﬂuence of art 8 in mortgage repossession cases.
Conversely, South African law has taken this leap as a result of the housing
clause in s 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of SouthAfrica, 1996.
Accordingly, this article indicates that the ‘creditors must win’ assumption
has to a large degree been undermined in South Africa. Developments in
South Africa might show English lawyers what to expect when the same
starts happening in the United Kingdom. Indeed, comparing developments
may be valuable for jurists in both countries. The enduring question is how
this human-rights notion functions in a traditional private-law relationship
such as the one between a home-owning debtor and a secured creditor.
Interestingly, both legal systems are faced with the traditional private-law
status quo being challenged on the basis of ‘external’ human-rights norms —
in South African private law, the Bill of Rights (enforced by the country’s
Constitutional Court) and in English domestic law, the European Conven-
tion (enforced by the European Court of Human Rights).
I contend in this article, following the South African example, that it is
workable to require human rights-based proportionality enquiries even in
mortgage cases, but I also acknowledge that practical difﬁculties arise as a
result of this approach. It is difﬁcult to balance the competing interests in
such cases, and it is only in exceptional cases that mortgage enforcement will
not go ahead because of the occupiers’ housing rights. Yet, I argue that giving
full recognition to and affording an opportunity for implementation of a
proportionality test is a step in the right direction. This approach seeks to
ensure that homes are protected as much as possible while it simultaneously
continues to recognise the legitimate interests of individual creditors and the
systemic and economic importance of allowing the enforcement of creditors’
security rights. Undoubtedly, further details would have to be worked out as
cases come before the court.
It must be emphasised that the article cannot include a discussion of each
and every detail; the idea is to highlight the salient points without necessarily
delving into how the theory translates into concrete legal structures and
procedures. Hence, the emphasis is not on technical or procedural matters,
but solely on the proportionality standard required by art 8 of the Conven-
tion and s 26 of the South African Constitution. The article discusses the
developments in England and South Africa in separate sections. Each section
includes an explanation of the human-rights instrument applicable and a
discussion of important case law. Even though the structure and wording of
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the two human-rights provisions differ, the underlying concepts are quite
similar — a proportionality test is required whenever a home is lost by virtue
of any legal process.
II ENGLISH LAW
(a) Introduction
English mortgage doctrine is based on the creditor’s right to take immediate
possession of the debtor’s property.8 The assertion of this right is one of the
main remedies at the creditor’s disposal, which is usually only resorted to as a
precursor to realisation of the security right by means of a sale with vacant
possession. Section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1970 has proven
to be a way, under appropriate circumstances, in which courts can protect
debtors against possessory actions.9 The court has a discretion to stay
possession so as to grant relief to those ﬁnding themselves in temporary
ﬁnancial difﬁculties.10 The question is whether art 8 of the Convention can
have any impact on the exercise of this discretion,11 or can provide a
different, broader principle upon which creditors’ claims can be defended
from a housing-rights perspective. As yet, this principle has not been
expressly recognised in mortgage cases. Consequently, reference must be
made to an analogous context, namely possession proceedings instituted by
local authority landlords against unlawful occupiers of rental property.
Although I sometimes refer to the United Kingdom, I speciﬁcally limit this
discussion to the law of England andWales — hence English law.
(b) Article 8 of the European Convention
Even though the United Kingdom does not have a Bill of Rights, English
law is subject to a human-rights instrument by virtue of the Human Rights
Act, 1998, which subjects domestic law to the Convention.12 The Act
requires that, as far as possible, legislation should be read and given effect to in
a way that is compatible with the Convention.13 Moreover, no public
8 See Four-Maids Ltd v Dudley Marshall (Properties) Ltd [1957] Ch 317 (ChD) at
320; Ropaigealach v Barclays Bank plc [2000] QB 263 at 284. See further Richard
Calnan Taking Security: Law and Practice 2 ed (2011) 286–7; Kevin Gray & Susan
Francis Gray Elements of Land Law 5 ed (2009) 755–61 and 768–72; Roger J Smith
Property Law 6 ed (2009) 570; Mark Wonnacott Possession of Land (2006) 74–90 and
other cases cited by these authors.
9 See Gray & Gray op cit note 8 at 773–80; Ben McFarlane The Structure of Property
Law (2008) 830–2; Smith op cit note 8 at 573–9;Wonnacott op cit note 8 at 81.
10 See Bank of Scotland v Grimes [1985] QB 1179 at 1190; Calnan op cit note 8 at
301.
11 See James Hurford ‘Does article 8 broaden the court’s powers under section 36
of the Administration of Justice Act 1970?’ (2014) 17 Journal of Housing Law 9–15.
I thank Sue Bright for bringing this article tomy attention.
12 For a discussion of the impact of human rights on English property law in
general, see Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 115–31.
13 Section 3(1) of theHumanRightsAct.
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authority may act in a way that is incompatible with the Convention.14 Since
courts are regarded as public authorities, their orders (including possession
orders) must be in line with the Convention.15
Article 8 of the Convention provides as follows:
‘(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.’
Article 8(1) sets out the content of the right that may not be interfered with.
People do not have a positive right to be provided with a home, but they are
protected against unlawful interference with their existing homes.16
Whether a property is a ‘home’does not depend on whether the occupier has
any proprietary interests in the land17 or whether his or her occupation is
lawful.18 In essence, whether a building is a home is a factual test, and to
succeed the claimant must show sufﬁcient and continuous links with the
place.19
Article 8(2) sets out the reasons which may justify interferences with the
right to respect for the home. Three pre-conditions must be met before the
right may be infringed: the interference must be prescribed by law; it must be
directed at one of the aims speciﬁed in art 8(2); and the interference must be
necessary in a democratic society.20 One of the valid aims, ‘the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others’, will probably include the rights of lenders
in terms of a mortgage agreement.21 However, this consideration is insufﬁ-
cient to justify interference with the debtor’s art 8 rights. The third condition
implies that one should also ask ‘whether there is a pressing social need for
[the interference] and whether it is proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued’,22 which is essentially a proportionality test. Therefore, a court has
14 Section 6(1) of theHumanRightsAct.
15 Section 6(3)(a) of the Human Rights Act. See also Timothy Powell Mortgage
Possession Proceedings (2012) 158.
16 X v Germany (1956) Yearbook ECtHR 202; Chapman v United Kingdom (2001)
33 EHRR399 at 427. See Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 460.
17 London Borough of Harrow v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43 para 97 (‘Qazi’). See also
Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 117.
18 Buckley v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 101 para 63; Qazi supra note 17 para
11. See also Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 117.
19 Gillow v United Kingdom (1986) SeriesANo 109 para 46; Qazi supra note 17 para
68.
20 R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] 3 WLR 922 paras 43–5. See
also Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 116.
21 Powell op cit note 15 at 159.
22 R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General supra note 20 para 45. See also Gray &
Gray op cit note 8 at 116.
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to examine whether the granting of a possession order would be necessary,
based on the impact the possession order would have on the individual
occupiers.23
As to what impact art 8 would have on the outcome of repossession cases,
one court has asked whether the article has created ‘a reservoir of entitlement
upon which the occupier of a home can draw in order to resist an order for
possession when domestic law leaves him defenceless’.24 In other words, do
English courts now have another layer of discretion based on the personal,
contextual and/or social merits of each individual case? Moreover, may
courts use this discretion to refuse to enforce rights and obligations that, save
for the Human RightsAct, are clear under domestic law?25 Initially it seemed
as if the Act might have brought about ‘a new species of property right in a
‘‘home’’ ’.26 The counter-argument was that the recognition of a
proportionality-based judicial discretion to refuse to enforce orthodox
property rights would create ‘novel rights to security of tenure in derogation
of the existing proprietary rights of others’.27 The fear was expressed that
such an approach would fundamentally transform the legal principles that
regulate the enforcement of property rights.28
Therefore, despite some earlier willingness to embrace what was seen as
the wide scope of the Human Rights Act,29 courts have since 2003 tried to
curb the argument that art 8 of the Convention creates parallel property
rights which can derogate from traditional property rights.30 Irrespective of
the courts’ rejection of the prospect that parallel property rights might be
based on art 8, the article does seem to require a proportionality test to
determine whether interferences with the home are justiﬁed.
The potential implication of art 8 in the mortgage context is that a
creditor’s inherent right to take possession may be judicially reviewed in light
of the Convention,31 since repossession almost always involves the eviction
of a family.32 Hence, art 8 might provide a foundation (or a trump card)33
23 Powell op cit note 15 at 159.
24 Patel v Pirabakaran [2006] 1WLR 3112 para 41. See also Gray & Gray op cit note
8 at 124; Amy Goymour ‘Proprietary claims and human rights — a ‘‘reservoir of
entitlement’’?’ (2006) 65 Cambridge LJ 696.
25 Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 124.
26 Newham LBC v Kibata [2003] 3 FCR 724 para 2. See also Gray & Gray op cit
note 8 at 124–5.
27 Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 124.
28 R (Gangera) v Hounslow LBC [2003] HLR 1028 para 49; Qazi supra note 17 para
109. See also Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 124.
29 See eg Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley PCC v Wallbank [2002] Ch 51
para 51.
30 Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 125.
31 Sarah Nield ‘Charges, possession and human rights: A reappraisal of s 87(1) of
the Law of PropertyAct 1925’ in Elizabeth Cooke (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law
vol 3 (2005) 155 at 155.
32 Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 771.
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from which to advance home arguments in domestic English law.34 For
instance, it has been argued that courts should ‘strike a balance between the
lender’s right to possession and the borrower’s fundamental Convention
rights’.35 With respect to applying art 8 to the mortgage context, Fox
speculates that
‘the court would be required to consider whether any interference with the
occupier’s right to respect for home (i e, losing the home in a possession action)
was justiﬁed by the need to protect the rights of the creditor, or . . . necessary
for the economic well being of the country’.36
This justiﬁcation test can be divided into a number of questions the court
should ask.37 In the ﬁrst place, the court must ask whether the infringement is
necessary. In other words, does it fulﬁl a legitimate need? Secondly, the court
must determine whether the interference is proportionate. That is, the
interference should not go any further than is necessary to achieve its goal. To
answer this question the court would have to enquire whether less restrictive
means are available to achieve that goal.38 However, as Fox points out, ‘the
issue of proportionality between the right to respect for home and the
measures imposed to protect the legitimate rights of creditors has not been
explicitly worked out in judgments . . .’.39
What is more, the possibility that postponement of the creditor’s rights
might provide a more proportionate response than immediate repossession
has not been considered in the art 8 framework.40 Most art 8 cases have
related to local authority landlords who evict unlawful occupiers or those
whose tenancies have been lawfully terminated. Consequently, one has to
draw upon principles that have been established in this analogous context to
investigate the possible impact of art 8 on mortgage possession cases. Despite
Fox’s argument that art 8 might contribute to a more coherent conceptualisa-
tion of home interests,41 courts seem to restrict the application of respect for
the home. However, as is illustrated by developments in case law, the door is
opening for the courts to apply a proportionality test in cases where people
face the possibility of losing their homes. The question is whether this
opening door is also changing the foundation upon which mortgage doctrine
is built, namely the creditor’s unqualiﬁed right to immediate possession.
33 Susan Bright ‘Dispossession for arrears: The weight of home in English law’ in
Lorna Fox O’Mahony & James A Sweeney (eds) The Idea of Home in Law — Displace-
ment and Dispossession (2011) 14 at 18–20.
34 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 453.
35 Powell op cit note 15 at 162.
36 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 455.
37 Ibid at 455–6.
38 Ibid at 480.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid at 456–8.
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(c) Developments in case law
For purposes of this article, it is unnecessary to provide an in-depth discussion
of the relevant cases.42 The major point I want to highlight is how the courts’
willingness to apply a proportionality test in repossession cases has progressed
from London Borough of Harrow v Qazi43 (‘Qazi’) to the more recent decisions
in Manchester City Council v Pinnock44 (‘Pinnock’) and London Borough of
Hounslow v Powell; Leeds City Council v Hall; Birmingham City Council v
Frisby45 (‘Powell’). Furthermore, I wish to underline the general principles
regarding proportionality in possession cases so as to expose the potential for
applying these principles in the mortgage context as well.
(i) Qazi
The decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (now the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) in Qazi46 came as a blow to those
hoping to employ art 8 of the Convention as a defence for occupiers against
possessory actions by landlords and creditors. Indeed, the court appeared to
have eliminated completely the possibility of such a defence,47 which would
have infused a proportionality enquiry into possessory proceedings and
would potentially have opened up a greater scope for protecting occupiers’
home interests.
In an eviction application by a local authority, it was argued that the
Human RightsAct requires the court to investigate the proportionality of the
eviction in light of the tenant’s right under art 8 to respect for his or her
home. However, the court held that art 8 provides no basis upon which to
defend actions brought by parties that are entitled to obtain possession under
domestic law, such as landlords and mortgage creditors. In fact, the court
explained that there will be no interference under art 8 if the party who seeks
possession of a home is merely doing so as a result of enforcing existing
proprietary and/or contractual rights under domestic law. In other words,
the court held that there was no discretion based on ‘the degree of impact on
the tenant’s home life’.48 Article 8 rights can never defeat contractual and
proprietary rights that have crystallised under domestic law.49 Moreover,
42 In the footnotes accompanying the discussion of case law below, I provide
references to further literature which can be consulted for more details. For an analy-
sis of the cases, see also Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe ‘The saga of Strasbourg and
social housing’ in Nicholas Hopkins (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law vol 7 (2013) at
3–14.
43 Supra note 17.
44 [2010] UKSC 45.
45 [2011] UKSC 8.
46 Supra note 17. My summary of the court’s conclusions is partially based on Fox
Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 482. See also Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 125–7;
A J van derWalt Property in the Margins (2009) 50–1.
47 See Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 482–3.
48 Qazi supra note 17 para 146.
49 Ibid paras 84, 108–9, 125, 149 and 151–2.
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art 8 does not confer on occupiers ‘some countervailing property rights’.50
The effect is that the home interest is ‘automatically defeated’, since one
cannot argue a violation of art 8.51
Although the case dealt with a former tenant who sought to avoid a
possession order in favour of the local authority landlord, the majority of the
court anticipated that their approach would also apply to disputes between
creditors and occupiers.52 For example, the court relied on Wood v United
Kingdom,53 where a mortgagor challenged the repossession of her home (due
to default) under art 8 of the Convention. She claimed that the repossession
infringed on her right to respect for ‘private and family life’ and the ‘home’.
However, the European Human Rights Commission rejected this challenge,
because any interference with the mortgagor’s home was in accordance with
the terms of the loan agreement and domestic English law. In other words,
the repossession satisﬁed the requirement of art 8(2) of the Convention. It
was ‘necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’,
namely the mortgage lender.54
Therefore, the court in Qazi held that it was not necessary for the court to
assess whether the taking of possession was proportionate under the circum-
stances, since it was a ‘foregone conclusion’ that any interference would be
justiﬁed.55
(ii) Connors
It was not long before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
had its say on the matter of art 8 and its effect on possessory actions in
domestic English law. Connors v United Kingdom56 (‘Connors’) concerned
‘gypsies’ (Travellers) living on local authority land without any contractual or
proprietary rights to occupy. In other words, the local authority was entitled
to possession. The dispute in the case was not whether there was interference
under art 8; the parties agreed to this fact. They also accepted that the
infringement was in keeping with the law and that it pursued a legitimate
50 Ibid para 127.
51 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 483–4, with reference to Qazi supra
note 17 paras 77, 103 and 149.
52 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 486.
53 (1997) 24 EHRR CD 69. See also Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at
477–8.
54 Wood supra note 53 at 70–1. See also Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at
478; Gray & Gray op cit note 8 at 771; Sarah Nield ‘Clash of the titans: Article 8,
occupiers and their home’ in Susan Bright (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law vol 6
(2011) 101 at 106. The application of art 8 to creditor–occupier disputes was also
rejected in eg Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services Ltd v Sabherwal (1999) 90 P&CR
256; Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484 (CA) paras 16–18; Karia v Franses & another [2001]
All ER (D) 161. This rejection is despite earlier indications that courts might
acknowledge the relevance of art 8: see eg Albany Home Loans v Massey [1997] 2 All
ER 609 at 612.
55 Qazi supra note 17 para 103; Goymour op cit note 24 at 700.
56 [2005] 40 EHRR 9. For a summary of the case, see Gray & Gray op cit note 8 at
127–8; Goymour op cit note 24 at 700.
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aim. Instead, the court was asked to assess whether, under art 8(2), the
eviction was justiﬁed as ‘necessary in the interests of a democratic society’.
Therefore, in contrast to the majority’s decision in Qazi, the European Court
of Human Rights was willing to apply a proportionality test.57 The court also
emphasised the importance of procedural safeguards, without which the
proportionality test is bound to fail.58 Hence, Connors seemed to imply that
the decision in Qazi was wrong and that the art 8 proportionality test
remained available.59
(iii) Kay and Price
The inconsistencies between the approaches adopted in Connors (European
Court of Human Rights) and Qazi (House of Lords) became evident in Price
v Leeds City Council,60 a case decided by the Court of Appeal. The court
recognised that Connors was clearly in conﬂict with the approach adopted in
Qazi. On the authority of Connors, the Court of Appeal was bound to accept
that the issues of justiﬁcation and proportionality had to be considered under
art 8. This would be the case even if the party seeking possession had an
absolute right to obtain such possession under domestic law.61 Even though
the court in theory approved the approach of the European Court of Human
Rights, it nevertheless followed the approach taken in Qazi because of the
precedent that decision had set. Yet, the court granted leave to appeal so that
the House of Lords could reconsider the matter and either accept or reject
the approach in Connors. The Court ofAppeal also heard a second case in this
regard, Kay v London Borough of Lambeth,62 where it again elected not to
follow the European Court of Human Rights because it deemed Connors to
apply only in the context of Travellers.
The debate again reached the House of Lords in the conjoined appeals of
Kay v London Borough of Lambeth; Leeds City Council v Price63 (‘Kay and Price’).
Although the case dealt with repossession of properties belonging to local
authorities, the court mentioned that its decision as to the inﬂuence of art 8
would probably have a broader impact on all recovery-of-possession cases.64
The House of Lords partially approved the approach of the European Court
of Human Rights by accepting that a possession order constituted a violation
of an occupier’s rights under art 8. Nevertheless, the majority of the court
held that a court would have the power to assume, for purposes of art 8(2),
57 See Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 503–4.
58 Connors supra note 56 para 92.
59 See Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 128.
60 [2005] EWCACiv 289.
61 Price v Leeds City Council [2005] EWCACiv 289 para 29. See also Fox Conceptu-
alising Home op cit note 1 at 504–5.
62 [2004] EWCACiv 926.
63 [2006] UKHL 10. For discussions, see Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at
505–18; Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 128–31; Goymour op cit note 24 at 698–708.
64 Kay and Price supra note 63 para 64. This summary of the court’s decision is based
on discussions by Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 506–9 and Goymour op
cit note 24 at 701–3.
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that domestic law has already struck the correct proportionate balance
between the competing interests. In fact, in most cases the claimant’s
entitlement to possession in terms of domestic law would automatically
provide the justiﬁcation required by art 8(2).65
However, the court was split on whether the occupier should be afforded
a fair opportunity to argue that the requirements in art 8(2) had not been met
on the facts of the case. The minority favoured such an opportunity,66 while
the majority deemed the opportunity to be unnecessary in each individual
case. The majority held that a defence based on nothing more than the
occupier’s personal circumstances could not succeed.67 It would only be in
highly exceptional circumstances that art 8 could provide occupiers with a
defence. The court would only consider art 8 and conduct a proportionality
test if an art 8 violation was ‘seriously arguable’.68 Therefore, the majority
decided that the legal rules could be challenged by arguing that they violated
art 8, but that art 8 could not be used to dispute the outcome of individual
cases based on the particular circumstances of those cases. It was argued that if
the rules conformed to art 8, their application to individual cases would by
necessary implication also comply with art 8.69
Even though the court’s interpretation of art 8 was still quite restrictive and
the defences based on it failed in Kay and Price, the court modiﬁed its
approach in Qazi to a certain extent by taking another step closer to allowing
the proportionality standard in English law. According to Bright,70 the
decision in Kay and Price makes it clear that a possessory action involves
interference with the right to respect for one’s home, even when there is no
lawful right to occupy. However, the claimant’s lawful right to recover
possession will usually justify any interference with art 8. Fox explains the
progress made in this case as follows:
‘Even if the individual circumstances of the occupier could not be taken into
account, the views of the majority in Kay and Price permitted that the overall
balance struck by a legal provision or, indeed, a common law doctrine could —
at least in principle — be called into account underArticle 8.’71
Therefore, although a proportionality enquiry would probably not be
possible in most individual cases, occupiers would have be able to challenge
the legal provisions themselves if it could be proven that such provisions did
not strike the acceptable balance.
As regards the impact of art 8 in mortgage cases, some authors have
expressed scepticism as to whether the case would make any real difference.
65 Kay and Price supra note 63 para 29.
66 Ibid para 29.
67 Ibid para 172.
68 Ibid paras 39, 56 and 110.
69 Goymour op cit note 24 at 703.
70 Bright op cit note 33 at 18.
71 Fox Conceptualising Home op cit note 1 at 509, with reference to Kay and Price
supra note 63 paras 110, 185 and 198.
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For example, Gray & Gray72 doubted whether the decision in Kay and Price
would improve the legal position adopted in Qazi. Nevertheless, the authors
also doubted whether English law would be able to continue to resist ‘the
rejuvenating force of ‘‘new equity’’ based on Convention standards’.73
(iv) McCann and Doherty
In a case subsequent to Kay and Price, the European Court of Human Rights
in McCann v United Kingdom74 (‘McCann’) again emphasised the need for
balancing to take place before a home is lost.75 The court explained that
‘the loss of one’s home is a most extreme form of interference with the right to
respect for the home. Any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude
should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure
determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles
under Article 8 of the Convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law,
his right of occupation has come to an end . . .’.76
Despite the insistence of the European Court of Human Rights that a
proportionality test must be applied before homes are lost, English courts
remained reluctant to consider personal circumstances under the umbrella of
human rights.77 For example, in Doherty v Birmingham City Council78
(‘Doherty’) the House of Lords displayed ‘judicial discomfort’ with the stance
taken in McCann.79 In fact, the court in Doherty effectively ignored the
approach followed in McCann,80 probably because McCann was delivered
between the hearing and delivery of judgment in Doherty. The court
sidestepped the problems raised by the approach in McCann by stating that
the European Court of Human Rights did not fully understand English
domestic conditions, and did not provide proper guidelines as to which
procedural safeguards would be adequate.81 The matter was referred back to
the county court, where a judicial review of the local authority’s decision had
to be conducted.
(v) Pinnock and Powell
Despite initial resistance the United Kingdom Supreme Court decided in
2011 to allow more scope for art 8 in the context of evictions by local
authorities. In Pinnock82 the court recognised the need for English courts to
72 Gray &Gray op cit note 8 at 771.
73 Ibid at 131.
74 [2008] LGR 474.
75 See Bright op cit note 33 at 18–19.
76 McCann supra note 74 para 50, as quoted by Bright op cit note 33 at 18–19.
77 Bright op cit note 33 at 19.
78 [2008] UKHL57.
79 Bright op cit note 33 at 19.
80 Nield in Bright (ed) op cit note 54 at 116.
81 Doherty supra note 78 paras 20–2; Nield in Bright (ed) op cit note 56 at 116.
82 Supra note 44. This discussion of the case is largely based on the summary by
Amy Goymour ‘Possession proceedings and human rights — The ﬁnal word?’ (2011)
70 Cambridge LJ 9. See also Powell op cit note 15 at 161–4.
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stop resisting the clear stance adopted by the European Court of Human
Rights.83 The effect of this decision was that English courts would now have
the power to review the decisions of local authorities to evict in violation of
art 8 and to make their own assessment as to the proportionality of the
eviction.84 In addition, the court held that art 8 should no longer be conﬁned
to exceptional cases; instead, courts should test the proportionality of the
eviction whenever the occupier raised the issue.85
In view of persistent uncertainty as to how art 8 would be applied in
individual cases, the court gave some much-needed guidance. The court
dispelled some fears by stating that the ‘unencumbered property rights’ of the
local authority and its ‘right — indeed the obligation . . . to decide who
should occupy its residential property’ are two factors that weighed heavily in
favour of the local authority.86 Hence, repossessions by local authorities
would almost always comply with art 8.87 However, the big step forward in
this case was that the court acknowledged that the occupier’s personal
circumstances may in some cases lead to a different outcome, for instance in
cases of special vulnerability.88
The fact that courts should consider art 8 in eviction cases could create
practical risks. First, this approach may unduly burden county courts which
hear possession cases and, secondly, existing property rights may be destabi-
lised if occupiers rely on art 8. These considerations may have been among
the reasons why the courts had previously resisted the inﬂuence of art 8.
However, the court addressed both these risks in Pinnock. Concerning the
ﬁrst risk, the court held that art 8 should be considered only if the occupier
raised it. Therefore, the court would not have to automatically consider it in
each case. The second risk was addressed by the court’s afﬁrmation that
property rights would carry signiﬁcant weight during the proportionality
test. In effect, art 8 would only prevent the enforcement of existing property
rights if such enforcement would exploit the vulnerability of others.
Goymour mentions that this approach strikes ‘an eminently sensible
balance between an authority’s property rights and an occupier’s rights under
Article 8’.89 However, it is important to consider that the court expressly
limited its decision to possession proceedings brought by local authorities.90
83 Pinnock supra note 44 para 48.
84 Goymour op cit note 82 at 10.
85 Pinnock supra note 44 para 51.
86 Ibid para 54. The second factor, namely the local authority’s obligations regard-
ing the provision of housing, is arguably not directly relevant when comparing their
role to that of mortgage creditors. Banks are not obliged to grant loans or to provide
housing. Instead, they have an obligation towards their shareholders to manage the
bank’s affairs in a proﬁtable manner. Therefore, one must recognise that the ﬁnancial
well-being of creditors is a general consideration when ﬁnding a balance between the
interests of all parties concerned.
87 Goymour op cit note 82 at 11.
88 Pinnock supra note 44 para 53.
89 Goymour op cit note 82 at 11.
90 Pinnock supra note 44 para 50.
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Moreover, in this case the court held that the particular eviction was in fact
proportionate. It remains to be seen whether the court will eventually
expand this approach to possession disputes between private parties. At least
this judgment introduced the possibility of presenting similar arguments in
creditor–occupier disputes.As Nield comments:
‘Pinnock may have resolved the clash [between the House of Lords and the
European Court of Human Rights] but in so doing it opens the door on a
wholesale reassessment of the compatibility of repossession proceedings affect-
ing the home.As such, it is a landmark decision.’91
Even so, despite the progressive step taken in Pinnock, the court seems to
have retracted the practical application of this position somewhat in Powell.92
Cowan & Hunter contrast the two decisions, stating that Pinnock was framed
in positive terms, whereas Powell was framed in negative terms.93 In Pinnock,
the court introduced a proportionality-based test, whereas in Powell it
narrowed the scope of application of this defence to an ‘uncertain, but
constricted, band of occupiers’.94
In Powell, the court expressed the opinion that it would have to be a ‘very
highly exceptional’ case before a court would even consider a proportionality
argument95 — this despite the fact that the court in Pinnock had earlier held
that exceptionality is not a proper test.96 In neither of the cases could the
court provide examples of circumstances which would lead to an eviction
being regarded as disproportionate.97 The only guidance Powell gave was that
disproportionality might be arguable if the occupier used to be homeless and
would again face homelessness if evicted.98 Hence, the fact that occupiers are
vulnerable seems to be the only clear guiding factor that may lead a court to
consider proportionality.99
Therefore, although Pinnock opened the door to considering proportion-
ality,100 Powell restricted its ambit when faced with the practical implications
of this test.101 The latter case illustrates the practical difﬁculties of trying to
identify personal circumstances which might outweigh the absolute propri-
etary rights (and obligations) of parties like local authorities. Exceptional
vulnerability seems to be the only possible factor which might cause courts to
consider the proportionality aspect.102
91 Nield op cit note 56 at 129. See also Powell op cit note 15 at 161.
92 Supra note 45.
93 Dave Cowan & Caroline Hunter ‘ ‘‘Yeah but, no but’’— Pinnock and Powell in
the SupremeCourt’ (2012) 75 Modern LR 78 at 78–9.
94 Ibid.
95 Powell supra note 45 paras 35 and 92.
96 Pinnock supra note 44 para 51.
97 Cowan&Hunter op cit note 93 at 83.
98 Powell supra note 45 para 66.
99 Cowan&Hunter op cit note 93 at 84.
100 Powell op cit note 15 at 164.
101 Cowan&Hunter op cit note 93 at 84.
102 Powell op cit note 15 at 163.
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(d) Remarks
The foregoing discussion of United Kingdom and European Court of
Human Rights cases shows that ‘[t]he state of the Article 8 jurisprudence is
unclear’103 and that these cases ‘are by no means the last word on the
subject’.104 In fact, art 8 has had relatively little impact on the actual outcome
of possession cases.105 Despite the more accommodating stance adopted by
the European Court of Human Rights in McCann, it seems that, in the words
of Bright, ‘a direct human rights challenge to possession is unlikely to succeed
in English law’.106As Nield explains,
‘[t]he recognition that Article 8 dictates an appropriate forum and opportunity
for the respect due to an occupier’s home to be weighed, within the
proportionality balance, against legal rights to possession is a message that the
House of Lords has found difﬁcult to swallow’.107
Even in Pinnock, where the United Kingdom Supreme Court aligned its
approach more closely with that of the European Court of Human Rights, it
was held that the particular eviction was proportionate and consequently
complied with art 8. Moreover, the emphasis on existing property rights as a
factor that weighs heavily in favour of claimants (such as local authorities)
remains.
Although, in principle, personal circumstances can, since Pinnock, play a
greater role, to my knowledge we are yet to see instances where such
circumstances actually outweigh existing property rights, or at least result in a
different balance being struck. As Powell illustrates, the proportionality test
approved in Pinnock will have an impact only in highly exceptional
circumstances. The facts of the case would have to show severe vulnerability
and it would have to be proved that the claimant’s insistence on repossession
was aimed at exploiting the situation. The same would probably apply in
mortgage cases, as my explanation of the South African experience below
shows.
It is pertinent to consider that none of the cases discussed above (except
Wood, referred to in the discussion on Qazi) involved a mortgage. Conse-
quently, it may still seem unlikely that an art 8 defence would render much
assistance to English mortgagors. Nevertheless, in principle, the proportion-
ality test should be available in cases where debtors raise arguments in this
regard. If the line of English cases described here is anything to go by,
mortgagors would have to prove that their circumstances are highly
exceptional and that they are vulnerable in some way or another.
These cases are also interesting because of the analogies which can be
drawn between landlord–tenant evictions and mortgage repossessions. In
both situations the claimants are relying on their proprietary and contractual
103 Bright op cit note 33 at 20.
104 Cowan&Hunter op cit note 93 at 79.
105 Bright op cit note 33 at 20.
106 Ibid at 18.
107 Nield in Bright (ed) op cit note 54 at 118.
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entitlement (under domestic law) to immediately take possession of the
property. In both scenarios the occupiers face the loss of their homes and
hence an interference with the right to respect for their home. At a general
level, both instances illustrate the tension between the easily quantiﬁable
proprietary and contractual rights of one party and the human rights-based
home interest of the other. The question is whether a distinction will
ultimately be drawn between two possible approaches to this kind of tension,
depending on whether it is a landlord–tenant or a mortgage case. What
would the basis be for the difference in approach (if any) and could the
distinction be justiﬁed? For example, would the type of creditor/landlord
(private versus public) be enough to justify a different approach? In my view
this factor would probably inﬂuence the details of the test in the particular
case (as one of many factors), but not the very approach that should be
followed. It is my view that the South African position (discussed below)
could be read to support this view.
A potentially valuable example for English lawyers is the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in Zehentner v Austria,108 a case dealing
with debt enforcement in Austria. The facts concerned a vulnerable woman
who suffered from mental incapacity and lost her apartment as a result of
recovery of a relatively small, unsecured debt. The European Court of
Human Rights found that theAustrian process for recovering relatively small
debts was incompatible with art 8. The court especially emphasised the
importance of procedural safeguards, which were lacking in this case.
Nield argues that this case is signiﬁcant for English law for a number of
reasons.109 First, art 8 was applied to a dispute between private parties — a
debtor and her creditors, who used the judgment execution process against
her home. Secondly, the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged
that ‘the protection of creditors through the enforcement of judgment debts
was a legitimate aim which could be justiﬁed under Article 8’.110 However,
the court emphasised that the problem in this case was proportionality; in
other words the relationship between the legitimate goal and the means used
to achieve that goal. In the Austrian case, the procedure allowed for strict
time limits in which the debtor could defend her case. Since these time limits
were too strict, they were not justiﬁed by the goal of promoting an efﬁcient
enforcement process. Where debtors are vulnerable (for example, mentally
frail) the state has a positive duty to provide speciﬁc protection for them.
Even though the case was decided with reference to the Austrian context
rather than English law, it illustrates the willingness of the European Court of
Human Rights to apply art 8 and its proportionality test to disputes between
debtors and creditors.
108 (2011) 52 EHRR 22. My summary of this case is based on Nield in Bright (ed)
op cit note 54 at 112–13.
109 Nield in Bright (ed) op cit note 54 at 113, with reference to Zehentner supra note
108 paras 61–5.
110 Ibid.
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The question then is whether the line of reasoning in the English cases as
enunciated in the latest decisions of Pinnock and Powell will eventually spill
over into appropriate mortgage cases. Most academics seem to support and
expect such a result. For instance, Nield & Hopkins111 recently applied the
art 8 test to the interests of children in mortgage repossession cases. The
authors accept that
‘[i]t is now clear that the exercise of a legal right to possession of an individual’s
home is one of the most serious interferences with the respect due to the home
underArt 8(1) and must be justiﬁed by the qualiﬁcations found inArt 8(2)’.112
Regardless of general academic support, courts are still to endorse such
arguments in mortgage cases. Moreover, even if courts were expressly to
require a proportionality test in mortgage repossession cases, the next
question would be how this enquiry should be applied in the present legal
regime. The purpose of the next section is to discuss the developments
regarding this question in SouthAfrica.
III SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
(a) Introduction
South African mortgage doctrine is based on a system of real and limited real
rights in property. By means of a mortgage agreement and a registered
mortgage bond, a creditor obtains a limited real right of security in a debtor’s
property. This right entitles the creditor to ‘call up the bond’when the debtor
defaults — often loosely referred to as ‘foreclosure’. This remedy involves a
procedure which culminates in a court order allowing the creditor to have
the property attached and sold in execution at a public auction. Unlike the
position in English law, the debtor is not evicted before the sale takes place,
since the creditor’s remedy is not based on a right to take possession. Eviction
takes place after the property has been sold and at the instance of the new
owner of the property.113
In this section, I focus on the impact s 26 of the South African Constitu-
tion has had on enforcement of the creditor’s remedy in so far as the debtor’s
home is concerned. I commence with an analysis of the housing clause itself,
after which I place the theory in context with reference to case law.
111 Sarah Nield & Nicholas Hopkins ‘Human rights and mortgage repossession:
Beyond property law usingArticle 8’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 431.
112 Ibid at 442.
113 For more on the law of real security in South Africa, see standard works such as
P J Badenhorst, Juanita M Pienaar & Hanri Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law
of Property 5 ed (2006) ch 16; G F Lubbe ‘Mortgage and pledge’ revised by T J Scott in
W A Joubert & J A Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa vol 17 Part 2 2 ed (2008);
T J Scott & Susan Scott Wille’s Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa 3 ed (1987);
C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) ch 14. See also Reghard Brits Mortgage
Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and National Credit Act (unpublished
LLD dissertation, StellenboschUniversity, 2012) ch 2.
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(b) Section 26 of the Constitution
The SouthAfrican housing clause states the following:
‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.’
The structure, interpretation and application of s 26 in various contexts are
complicated matters. Here, I simplify the principles as much as possible in
view of how they appear to be crystallising in mortgage enforcement cases.
Section 26(3) requires that evictions from homes must be authorised by a
court order, which may only be granted after the court has taken all the
relevant circumstances into consideration, and that no legislation may permit
arbitrary evictions. As a whole, the section provides procedural protection
and ensures that occupiers’ circumstances are judicially considered before an
eviction from a home takes place. Evictions are permissible, but arbitrary
results must be avoided. In this regard the court has a discretion based on all
the relevant circumstances.114
Although in South African law a sale in execution of mortgage property
technically does not qualify as an ‘eviction’, courts have applied the principle
in s 26(3) to mortgage cases.115 The reasoning has been that, because a sale in
execution is likely to lead to eviction proceedings in the normal course of
events, the enquiry required by the Bill of Rights should not be postponed
until the eviction. Therefore, at the earliest moment possible, a court should
review the debtor’s relevant circumstances so as to prevent the sale (if
appropriate on the facts) rather than only considering the issue during the
later eviction proceedings, after the debtor has already lost ownership. The
beneﬁt of this reading is that a judicial discretion in deciding an application
for an execution order prevents abuses and unjustiﬁed violations of debtors’
rights from occurring during this early stage already, before a purchaser in
114 For authoritative comments on s 26(3), see eg Port Elizabeth Municipality v Vari-
ous Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 22. On the interpretation and application of
the housing clause in general, see further Sandra Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights:
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 317–58; Sandra Liebenberg
‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 2 2 ed (OS 2003) ch 33; Kirsty McLean
‘Housing’ in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South
Africa vol 4 2 ed (OS 2006) ch 55; Geraldine van Bueren ‘Housing’ in M Cheadle,
D Davis & N Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law — The Bill of Rights 2 ed
(2005) ch 21.
115 For more detailed justiﬁcation of this broader interpretation, see Brits op cit
note 113 para 3.3.2; R Brits & A J van der Walt ‘Application of the housing clause
during mortgage foreclosure: A subsidiarity approach to the role of the National
CreditAct (part 1)’2014 TSAR 288.
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good faith seeks an eviction order.116 As one court put it, ‘the execution
process is equated with eviction’ for s 26(3) purposes.117
Therefore, s 26(3) provides procedural protection and ensures that a
judicial ofﬁcer exercises a discretion based on the facts of each case before any
order is granted which may involve eviction from a home. However, the
questions arise of which circumstances are relevant and what the test is to
decide whether or not a home can be sold. To answer these questions one
must rely on the principles surrounding s 26(1), since they convey what the
section as a whole aims to protect at a substantive level, namely everyone’s
‘right to have access to adequate housing’. Although the terminology differs,
this notion is similar to the European Convention’s respect for the home (art
8(1)).
The primary purpose of s 26(1), read with s 26(2), is to impose a positive
duty on the state to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right’.
However, it is accepted that s 26(1) also imposes a negative duty on all
persons not to limit someone’s existing access to adequate housing.118 The
key to how this provision applies in mortgage cases lies in the nature of Bill of
Rights litigation, which involves a two-step approach. The aggrieved party
must ﬁrst prove that he or she is a beneﬁciary of the right and that this right
has been violated. Then, the defendant must prove that this infringement is
justiﬁable under s 36 of the Constitution.119
Since the terminology of the section is not perfectly suited to a negative
duty, it is not entirely clear when someone’s ‘right to have access to adequate
housing’ will be limited. An overly technical and restrictive reading of the
section may relegate the application of the right to a very limited category of
116 See Nedbank Ltd v Fraser & another & Four other Cases 2011 (4) SA 363 (GSJ) para
9; Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Erasmus & another; Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd
NO v Cleophas & another; Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Frederick & another [2009]
ZAWCHC175 paras 7–8.
117 Nedbank Ltd v Fraser & another & Four other Cases supra note 116 para 9, with
reference to Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC) para 41. See also
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Snyders 2005 (5) SA 610 (C) paras 7, 22 and 29; Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Bekker 2011 (6) SA111 (WCC) para 8.
118 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 78; Government of
the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA46 (CC) para 34; Minister of
Health & others v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) para 46;
Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 34; Maphango v
Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA531 (CC) para 32.
119 S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) paras 41–4; S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391
(CC) paras 100–2. This approach originates from Canadian law: see Theunis Roux &
Dennis Davis ‘Property’ in M Cheadle, D Davis & N Haysom (eds) South African
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (Service 10, 2011) ch 20 at 6, citing the
Canadian case of R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 at 223–4. In general, see also
Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) at 26 and 152–5;
Stu Woolman & Henk Botha ‘Limitations’ in Woolman & Bishop (eds) op cit note
114 vol 2 ch 34 at 18–29.
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homes. However, the general way in which most courts have interpreted and
applied the section indicates that the provision should enjoy a broader, more
purposive reading.120 Therefore, one can accept that any violation of a home
will implicate the provision. Courts tend to focus not on whether s 26(1) has
been violated, but rather on the justiﬁcation test.
This interpretation of the circumstances in which s 26(1) is violated
accords with the view of the European Court of Human Rights and later
English judgments as regards violation of art 8(1) of the Convention.
However, as with art 8, in South African law it is insufﬁcient to show a
violation of the right, since the right to have access to adequate housing is not
absolute. A limitation can be justiﬁed in accordance with s 36(1) of the
Constitution, which entails a similar notion to the one embodied in art 8(2)
of the Convention. It is worth mentioning that South African courts appear
to support a similar stance to their English counterparts: although a violation
might be easily assumed, the justiﬁcation will often also be presumed, save for
exceptional circumstances. Although a limitation of the debtor’s rights under
s 26(1) could be accepted, the extent of the limitation and its effects would
have to be proved and supported by special facts.
Therefore, the purpose of the discretion afforded to courts by s 26(3) is to
evaluate whether the substantive right protected under s 26(1) will experi-
ence a justifiable violation in terms of the principles set out in s 36(1) of the
Constitution. The degree to which the debtor’s access to adequate housing is
limited will then inﬂuence the justiﬁcation enquiry under s 36(1), which
provides that a right in the Bill of Rights may be limited only ‘to the extent
that the limitation is reasonable and justiﬁable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’. The clause lists ﬁve
non-exhaustive factors:
‘(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’121
In essence, s 36 requires a strict proportionality test.122 Hence, in view of
the importance of the right, the test requires a proportionate relationship
120 See eg the cases discussed below. For a more detailed explanation of this broader
interpretation, see also Brits op cit note 113 para 3.3.3; Brits & Van der Walt op cit
note 115 at 291–4.
121 Section 36(1)(a)–(e) of the Constitution. For an analysis of the ﬁve factors, see
Currie & De Waal op cit note 119 at 162–72; Woolman & Botha op cit note 119 at
70–92.
122 See Makwanyane supra note 119 para 149; S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC)
para 18; S v Mbatha 1996 (2) SA 464 (CC) para 14; National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA6 (CC) para 33; S v Manamela (Director-
General of Justice Intervening) 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 32. In the current context, the
strongest authority is Gundwana supra note 117 para 54; Jaftha supra note 118 paras 36
and 40–2.
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between the purpose of the violation and the impact of the violation on the
individual homeowner. As the case law discussed below shows, enforcement
of valid contractual debts, even against residential property, is a legitimate
public purpose. However, although it is rational to enforce validly registered
mortgage bonds, the proportionality test requires that this purpose must be
measured against the impact of the violation in individual cases.
To highlight one of the factors listed above, s 36(1)(e) indicates that a
limitation should probably not be allowed if alternative measures which will
be less invasive but will still achieve the same purpose are available. This is
probably the central element of the proportionality test — the one on which
most limitations will stand or fall.123 Consequently, in mortgage cases the
principle is that, if there is another reasonable way to achieve the creditor’s
purpose without having to sell the home, selling the home will not be a
justiﬁable solution. As case law shows, South African law accepts, in
principle, that enforcement of a mortgage bond registered over a home must
have a proportionate outcome. More particularly, there has to be a propor-
tionate relationship between the purpose of mortgage proceedings and their
ultimate effect on the debtor. As can be expected, application of the test is a
complicated matter and it is hard to give concrete guidelines in respect of
non-concrete matters. Case law nevertheless provides general principles
which can serve as a starting point in adjudicating new instances.
(c) Developments in case law
In this section I discuss some of the important cases concerning the housing
clause and the relationship between debtors and creditors. The two most
signiﬁcant cases were decided by the Constitutional Court, the second
endorsing and building upon the ﬁrst. Other noteworthy cases were decided
by the Supreme Court of Appeal and various divisions of the high court.
Unlike the English cases discussed above, where the facts related to
possessory actions by local authorities in the tenancy context, the South
African cases discussed below all related to debt enforcement and the impact
of debt enforcement on debtors’ homes.
(i) Jaftha
To simplify the facts, Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz124 (‘Jaftha’)
concerned two separate but similar situations where the debtors’ homes were
sold in execution of very small unsecured debts — R50 and R190,
respectively. The situations did not relate to mortgage bonds, and the debts
were not related to the properties themselves. Moreover, the debtors were
poor and poorly educated, and their homes had been acquired through state
subsidies. The case actually turned on a procedural point. The law as it stood
allowed for an execution order to be granted by a clerk of the magistrates’
court in instances where the debtor did not appear before the court to defend
123 See Currie &DeWaal op cit note 119 at 170–1.
124 Supra note 118.
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the matter.125 The result was that a home could be sold in execution without
a judicial ofﬁcer having had an opportunity to consider the facts of the case.
Based on the fact that a court would have to consider the debtor’s rights
under the housing clause, the Constitutional Court corrected the procedure
by requiring sufﬁcient judicial oversight. However, what is of more interest
in the present context is the manner in which the court applied the principles
in s 26(1) to this debt enforcement case. It also commented on how the
principles would operate in mortgage cases.
The court accepted that a sale in execution is a measure which may limit a
debtor’s existing access to adequate housing (s 26(1)).126 Therefore, the
violation would have to be justiﬁed in terms of s 36(1) of the Constitution. In
this regard the court found that, as part of the justiﬁcation test, ‘the nature of
the right and the nature and extent of the limitation are of great importance
when weighed against the importance of the purpose of the limitation’.127
There is no doubt that the purpose of the limitation of a debtor’s ‘access to
housing’ is important in the case of debt enforcement. Yet, the court held that
this importance is diminished in comparison to the nature of the debt:
‘It is difﬁcult to see how the collection of triﬂing debts in this case can be
sufﬁciently compelling to allow existing access to adequate housing to be totally
eradicated, possibly permanently, especially where other methods exist to
enable recovery of the debt.’128
Nevertheless, the court stated that it would not always be unjustiﬁable to
satisfy a triﬂing debt through sale in execution, because the notion of a
‘triﬂing debt’ cannot easily be deﬁned out of context.129 Because creditors’
interests should not be ignored, there may be cases where, regardless of the
small amount being claimed, ‘the creditor’s advantage in execution out-
weighs the harm caused to the debtor’.130 Yet, there may be instances of
unjustiﬁable executions, ‘because the advantage that attaches to a creditor
who seeks execution will be far outweighed by the immense prejudice and
hardship caused to the debtor’.131
The court further explained that any remedy should be ﬂexible enough to
take account of varying circumstances.132 Courts should accordingly take
‘cognisance of the plight of a debtor who stands to lose his or her security of
tenure’, but they must also be sensitive towards the interests of creditors.133
The court provided a few guidelines for the exercise of this discretion.134
First, if the debt can be paid in other reasonable ways, a sale of the home will
125 Section 66(1)(a) of theMagistrates’CourtsAct 32 of 1944.
126 Jaftha supra note 118 para 34.
127 Ibid para 36.
128 Ibid para 40.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid para 42.
131 Ibid para 43.
132 Ibid para 53.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid para 56.
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normally not be desirable. However, if there are no alternatives, execution
should be allowed unless a sale will be grossly disproportionate under the
circumstances. This kind of disproportionality will exist if
‘the interests of the judgment creditor in obtaining payment are signiﬁcantly
less than the interests of the judgment debtor in security of tenure in his or her
home, particularly if the sale of the home is likely to render the judgment
debtor and his or her family completely homeless’.135
Therefore, the size of the debt will be relevant and it may be unjustiﬁable to
limit a person’s s 26(1) rights if the debt is ‘triﬂing in amount and signiﬁcance’
to the creditor.136 Much will depend on the circumstances of each case.137
Although Jaftha did not deal speciﬁcally with a mortgage, the court made
some comments as to how these principles would apply in the case of a
mortgage. It held that if the house was burdened as security for the debt,
execution should normally be allowed, but that abuses of procedure should
not be tolerated.138 Furthermore, even though a mortgage creditor is
technically entitled to unqualiﬁed and direct execution against the home,
courts should consider whether there are alternatives which might lead to
debt recovery while at the same time avoiding the loss of a home.139 With
regard to ﬁnding the correct balance, the court commented that it ‘should
not be seen as an all or nothing process’.140 It is not a case of execution either
going ahead or the creditor not being allowed to claim repayment. Instead,
‘creative alternatives’ should be sought so that the debt can be recovered but
execution against the home is used only as a last resort.141
Jaftha is a ground-breaking decision and is still the leading case when
dealing with sales in execution of homes. The Constitutional Court ﬁrmly
established that solutions should be context sensitive and that court oversight
must entail a strict proportionality test that balances the legitimate purpose of
execution with the social and economic effects on homeowners. However,
the full impact of Jaftha and s 26 was not immediately appreciated.
(ii) Developments after Jaftha
Not long after Jaftha, the Supreme Court of Appeal was faced with the
question whether the principles enunciated in Jaftha apply to ‘normal’
mortgage cases. Earlier, in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson,142
the Supreme Court of Appeal had accepted (albeit reluctantly) the principle
that s 26(1) could be relevant in appropriate mortgage cases. A rule of court
was introduced in terms of which the creditor would have to inform the
debtor of his or her opportunity to argue a violation of his or her rights under
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid para 57.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid para 59.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 2006 (2) SA264 (SCA).
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the clause. However, the court was not optimistic as to the possibility of there
ever being instances where a s 26(1) defence would defeat a mortgage
creditor’s claim. It appeared to largely relegate the principles of Jaftha to the
type of extreme facts of that case.
Even though it did not seem as if a s 26(1) proportionality test would ever
make a difference in mortgage cases (except for heightened procedural
protection), some subsequent cases showed that a proportionality test could
indeed change the outcome of a particular case. The application of the test
turned on instances where the size of the debtors’ default was too small to
justify the loss of their homes. The normal rule is that a creditor can enforce
his or her rights regardless of how small the default is, but the requirements of
the housing clause have changed this doctrinal point of departure.
For example, on the date of the hearing, the mortgage debtors in ABSA
Bank Ltd v Ntsane143 (‘Ntsane’) were in arrears in an amount of R18.46. The
default triggered the creditor’s right to claim the full outstanding debt of
R62 042.43 and to execute this claim against the debtors’ home. Based on
the housing clause, the court recognised that, if the creditor succeeded, the
result would clearly be disproportionate. The court went as far as categorising
the creditor’s decision to enforce the mortgage as abusive and disgraceful. Of
course, it has to be emphasised that instances where mortgagees enforce their
rights due to extremely small arrears — as in the Ntsane case — are very
exceptional and that mortgagees will seldom institute enforcement proceed-
ings under such circumstances. Therefore, the case might appear not to be all
that helpful when analysing ‘normal’mortgage cases. However, even though
the facts of this case are quite extreme and unlikely to occur often, the
decision illustrates the general principle regarding proportionate outcomes in
mortgage cases. It also demonstrates the courts’ willingness to forsake
formalistic adherence to doctrine when the facts call upon them to do so.
Moreover, there may also be instances where the arrears seem reasonable
from the creditor’s perspective but, in view of all the circumstances
(including those of the debtor), the arrears might be small enough to indicate
the kind of disproportionality to which s 26(1), read with s 36(1), is opposed.
Firstrand Bank Ltd v Maleke144 (‘Maleke’) is an example of this possibility.
The facts were not as extreme as in some of the other cases, since the arrears
in the four instances under consideration ranged between R2000 and
R5000. Although not trivial, the court regarded these arrears as relatively
minor, particularly in comparison to the effect that mortgage enforcement
would have on the debtors. The housing clause played a big role in the
court’s analysis. The court applied a proportionality test in denying the
creditor’s claim, because (as I explain below) an alternative to all-out debt
enforcement and execution was available.
What these two examples illustrate is that, in ‘normal’ mortgage cases,
there may be instances where the size of the arrears would be too small — in
143 2007 (3) SA554 (T).
144 2010 (1) SA143 (GSJ).
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view of all the circumstances — to justify loss of the debtor’s home. It will no
doubt depend on the facts of each case and it is hard to determine, in an
abstract manner, which arrears would be too small. Contextual sensitivity is
unavoidably the nature of the proportionality test, and the challenge is to
decide whether normal procedures and requirements sufﬁciently provide for
the prevention of disproportionate outcomes in individual cases.
Something to consider too is that in 2007 (in between the decisions in
Ntsane and Maleke) new consumer legislation came into force in South
Africa, namely the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. Among other innova-
tions, the Act provides various debt-relief mechanisms for over-indebted
credit consumers, including mortgage debtors.145 In terms of the debt review
procedure, a debtor can obtain relief in the form of a court order which
rearranges the debt repayment plan. Elsewhere I have argued extensively that
the protection for debtors’ homes in South Africa should primarily be
channelled through this piece of consumer legislation.146 A major reason is
that thisAct and its mechanisms embody the way the legislature has chosen to
address problems resulting from over-indebtedness, which (although not
expressly stated in the Act) invariably include home repossessions in the
mortgage context. As a matter of fact, in the Maleke case referred to above,147
the court refused to uphold the creditor’s rights largely because theAct’s debt
review process could have provided a solution to the debtors’default, and this
solution would have rendered the loss of their homes unnecessary. The
contention therefore is that the proportionality test may often be satisﬁed by
virtue of the fact that certain debt-relief measures are available for debtors
who ﬁnd themselves in a situation where their homes are at risk. The point is
not that the Act is perfectly effective as is, but that measures focused on
relieving over-indebtedness are theoretically capable of giving effect to s 26
in the debt-enforcement context. Whether the Act can live up to this ideal
will be discovered as cases are heard.
Another important development took place with regard to the high court
procedural rules for execution against homes. Late in 2010, the Uniform
Rules of Court were amended to the effect that, when direct execution of a
judgment debt is sought against immovable property (including immovable
property subject to a mortgage bond), the court may grant the order only on
the condition that,
‘where the property sought to be attached is the primary residence of the
judgment debtor, no writ [warrant of execution] shall be issued unless the
145 For more on theAct, see standard works such as Michelle Kelly-Louw Consumer
Credit Regulation in South Africa (2012); J M Otto & R-L Otto The National Credit Act
Explained 3 ed (2013); J W Scholtz (ed) Guide to the National Credit Act (Service 4,
2012).
146 This argument was one of the main conclusions of my doctoral research. See
Brits op cit note 113. See also Brits & Van der Walt op cit note 115; R Brits &A J van
der Walt ‘Application of the housing clause during mortgage foreclosure:A subsidiar-
ity approach to the role of theNational CreditAct (part 2)’2014 TSAR 508.
147 Supra note 144.
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court, having considered all the relevant circumstances, orders execution
against such property’.148
The amended rule was clearly inspired by the housing clause and its
application in Jaftha, and confers on courts a discretion based on all the
relevant circumstances. However, the rule does not provide any guidance of
substance as to how this discretion should be exercised, which factors are
relevant, and which circumstances would justify a court’s refusal to allow a
sale in execution. In this regard one must refer to the constitutional principles
themselves (as explained above)149 and to the case law preceding and
following the introduction of this procedural protection for homeowners.
(iii) Gundwana
The second important Constitutional Court case is Gundwana v Steko
Development150 (‘Gundwana’). Unlike Jaftha, Gundwana was decided in the
mortgage context. After years of speculation as to Jaftha’s application in
‘normal’ mortgage cases, the country’s highest court ﬁnally conﬁrmed that
the same principles apply to mortgage cases. As with Jaftha, the problem in
Gundwana was one of procedure, namely whether the rule that allowed the
Registrar of the High Court to grant execution orders if the debtor failed to
defend his or her case was unconstitutional for the same reason that the court
had decided in Jaftha that a similar rule in the magistrates’ courts was invalid.
As in Jaftha, the procedural point was not the most interesting one, also
because the high court rules had in the meantime already been amended (as I
have pointed out above).151 The real question was whether a substantive
defence based on the proportionality test under s 26(1), read with s 36(1), of
the Constitution is available in mortgage cases before the High Court. One
contention was that the principle in Jaftha ought only to apply in exceptional
cases similar to the factual scenario in that case, and that it is not necessary
always to conduct a proportionality test in ‘normal’mortgage cases.152
The court held that, even though a mortgage bond is agreed to and is
registered against the debtor’s house, this does not entitle the creditor to
enforce execution in bad faith. Furthermore, a mortgage agreement does not
entail a waiver of the debtor’s rights under s 26.153 Courts should guard
against disproportionality, and they should consider how sale in execution
will affect the poor and those facing homelessness.154 The court explained
that one should especially be attentive when there is ‘disproportionality
148 Rule 46(1)(a)(ii) of the Uniform Rules of Court, effective from 24 December
2010: see GNR981 GG 33689 of 19November 2010.
149 See part III(b).
150 Supra note 117.
151 See part III(c)(ii) above.
152 For a discussion of the case, see A J van der Walt & R Brits ‘The purpose of
judicial oversight over the sale in execution of mortgaged property’ (2012) 75
THRHR 322.
153 Gundwana supra note 117 paras 44 and 47–48.
154 Ibid para 53.
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between the means used in the execution process to exact payment of the
judgment debt, compared to other available means to attain the same
purpose’.155
The court also focused on the availability of reasonable alternatives, which
should be considered before an execution order is granted against a home.156
Apart from these cautions, the court emphasised that execution against
homes is generally acceptable and a normal feature of economic life.157
What is signiﬁcant about this decision is that the court did away with the
line of argument that a proportionality test does not apply because the debtor
agreed to subject his or her home to a mortgage. Of course, the fact that there
is a mortgagee agreement, freely entered into, is a relevant consideration.
However, this factor does not override the court’s obligation to ensure that
the creditor’s actions (as lawful as they may be) do not have an effect on the
debtor that is disproportionate to the creditor’s debt enforcement purpose.
(iv) Some cases that applied Gundwana
After Gundwana and the amendment of rule 46 of the Uniform Rules of
Court, it was accepted that all mortgage cases which involve a home would
require a judge to exercise a discretion before granting an execution order.
Although it was also clear that proportionality would play a role, the practical
applications in individual cases still had to be worked out, in keeping with the
guidance provided by previous judgments. The major victory was that
home-owning debtors were now free to make arguments based on the
proportionality of the effects that sale in execution would have on their
home circumstances. It is impossible to discuss all the cases that have come
before the courts, but it is useful to refer to some of the important comments
judges have made as to how courts could approach these cases. What is
important is that the outcome of each case will depend on its own facts.
The ﬁrst example is Nedbank Ltd v Fraser & another & Four other Cases,158
where the court explained that its enquiry must be framed by the context and
purpose of the required judicial discretion. This it described as ‘an apparent
tension between two competing social values’ — on the one hand the
importance of housing, and on the other the importance of enforcing
contracts and discharging debts.159 Although the court expected creditors’
rights to enjoy relative primacy, it acknowledged that social values are
offended when the execution process is abused.160 The court mentioned the
example of a relatively minor debt, because the social value of ensuring that
155 Ibid para 54.
156 Ibid para 53.
157 Ibid.
158 Supra note 116.
159 Ibid paras 16–17.
160 Ibid paras 20–2.
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debts are discharged could easily be attained in a less invasive manner which
would save the home.161
Another example is that of FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher.162 Again with
reference to its obligation to ensure that the execution process is not abused,
the court explained that this notion of abuse is not limited to ‘wilfully
dishonest or vexatious’ conduct. Instead, the consequences of an execution
may be iniquitous simply because the debtor will lose his or her home despite
alternative ways of satisfying the creditor’s claim being available.163 The court
conﬁrmed that it must compare the ‘proportionality of prejudice that the
creditor might suffer if execution were to be refused’ and the ‘prejudice the
debtor would suffer if execution went ahead and he lost his home’.164
Furthermore, if comments in the case of Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v
Bekker165 are anything to go by, it appears that courts will assume that a sale in
execution will violate s 26(1). However, courts will often also adhere to the
following assumption:
‘[I]n the absence of unusual circumstances, or an abuse of process, execution
against hypothecated property which is the home of the mortgagor is prima facie
constitutionally justiﬁable, even if its effect would be to infringe the judgment
debtor’s section 26 rights.’166
(d) Remarks
The general line of reasoning described above as regards application of the
housing clause to mortgage cases does not differ much from the United
Kingdom Supreme Court’s current position regarding the application of art 8
and its proportionality test to possessory actions brought by local authorities.
Even though the person seeking possession (or enforcing his or her security)
has an unqualiﬁed substantive right in domestic private law, enforcement of
the right is assumed to violate the fundamental rights the occupier (or debtor)
has as regards the home. This development is radical and in effect changes the
traditionally unqualiﬁed right of the claimant (local authority landlord or
mortgage creditor) into one that is qualiﬁed by a human-rights norm that is
external to the agreement between the parties and the private-law rules
governing their relationship. Commenting on advances in English law, Nield
& Hopkins describe a similar shift ‘from a positive assertion of property rights
to a prima facie breach of human rights that requires vindication’.167
However, this radical shift in doctrine is countered by a similar assumption
in favour of the claimant — the violation will usually be assumed to be
161 Ibid para 22. See also Standard Bank of South Africa v Molwantwa & another [2011]
ZAGPPHC 108 para 12.
162 2011 (4) SA314 (GNP).
163 Ibid para 40.
164 Ibid para 41.
165 Supra note 117.
166 Ibid para 14 (original italics). See also Absa Bank Ltd v Petersen 2013 (1) SA 481
(WCC) para 37.
167 Nield &Hopkins op cit note 111 at 442.
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justiﬁed unless special circumstances exist or there is proof of abuse or
disproportionality. It appears that English courts will view the matter in the
same way. In other words, the full recognition of occupiers’ housing rights in
mortgage law does not defeat creditors’ rights or upset enforcement proce-
dures to such an extent that the mortgage market will suffer unduly. It is still
accepted that satisfactory enforcement of creditors’ rights is indeed required
for the continued availability of loans in the housing market. At the same
time, the enforcement of these rights must take account of the constitutional
aspiration of proportionality in all areas of the law, even in areas of private law
where such an ideal is largely foreign.
IV CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is not to provide a detailed explanation of the
mortgage enforcement systems in the United Kingdom and South Africa, or
to analyse in detail how a proportionality test would apply. Instead, the article
explains the general line of reasoning as regards the theory behind the
operation of art 8 of the European Convention and s 26 of the SouthAfrican
Constitution. The general trend of developments in the two jurisdictions has
been similar. The major difference is that English courts have yet expressly to
apply the proportionality test required by art 8 of the European Convention
to typical mortgage repossession cases, whereas South African courts have
done so by virtue of s 26 of the Constitution. It appears that the ‘creditors
must win’ assumption is still very strong in England, while SouthAfrican law
is moving away from this point of departure. For instance, by instinctively
saying that direct execution against a home ‘is not there for a take’,168 one
court has succinctly expressed the view that the ‘creditors must win’
assumption is probably no longer a reality in South Africa. Indeed, as South
African case law shows, this abstract assumption is in the process of being
replaced by a more contextual approach.
The South African housing clause has led to comprehensive developments
with respect to our understanding of mortgage enforcement. Because homes
are so important, they should only be infringed upon in justiﬁable circum-
stances, namely when there is a proportionate relationship between the
purpose of the limitation and the effect that the limitation would have on the
individual’s rights. This ambition requires a system which enables home-
owners to argue the proportionality of their case and empowers courts
seriously to consider all the circumstances of the matter — not only ﬁnancial,
but personal as well.
As is clear from experience in South Africa and England, it is one thing to
acknowledge a proportionality test in principle, but another thing to apply it
to the facts of cases. Although the proportionality test provides hope for
saving more homes, one should not be overly optimistic in expecting homes
168 Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v McDonald & another [2011] ZAGPPHC 106
para 10.
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to be saved in instances where there are absolutely no ﬁnancially viable
alternatives to execution. The idea behind recognising housing rights in the
mortgage context is by no means to upset the normal business of home loans
and debt enforcement. Instead, the goal is to avoid situations where homes
are lost unnecessarily (or worse) as a result of creditors’ abuses.
In conclusion it must be emphasised that the purpose of incorporating a
proportionality test into mortgage enforcement proceedings is not to create a
bias in favour of debtors’ housing rights at the expense of creditors’
reasonable commercial expectations and security rights. Therefore, the
important function that banks fulﬁl in providing ﬁnancing for the acquisition
of homes is fully recognised, and this factor will always play a part when
courts make decisions in mortgage cases. At the same time, it should be noted
that this factor, namely the importance of enforcing creditors’ rights, is not
enough to justify an abstract presumption in favour of creditors. Instead, the
goal behind proportionality is to rid the system of any presumptions and to
ensure that each case has an outcome that is fair in the context of the speciﬁc
situation, taking the interests of all parties into consideration, but without
starting from an abstract position that the ‘creditor must win’. In essence, the
proportionality test should facilitate a level playing ﬁeld between the parties,
one that avoids the scale being tipped unjustiﬁably in either direction.
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